“Democracy” probably isn’t the first word that comes to mind when talking about Iran.
But during the first half of the 20th century, the United States was heavily involved with democratization efforts in Iran as part of a strategy of building a buffer against Soviet influence in the Middle East.
Boston University Center for International Relations visiting scholar David Collier’s 2013 Ph.D. dissertation focused on the United States’ role in promoting and impeding democracy in Iran during the 1941-1979 reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.
Collier says the second Shah was put on the throne when Allied Powers forced his father from the throne for his close relations with Nazi Germany. The United States was able to pressure the 22-year-old Shah to stay outside of politics in order to let democratic institutions grow.
“The United States’ interest in democracy kind of waned over time. Other interests, such as oil and communism, became more dominant, and democracy took a slightly back seat in how the U.S. approached Iran, especially with Iran being on the border of the Soviet Union,” Collier says. “Over the course of the decades, he became more and more powerful, [and] the U.S. supported him more and more – gave him more financial aid, more military aid.”
By the early 1950s, unrest took hold as Iranians called for more rights and a better foundation of democracy, leading to a U.S.-backed coup in 1953 to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq.
“The U.S. came to see democracy as nationalism, and that was very dangerous to their interests,” Collier says. “If it was independent, it may move more toward the Soviet Union or to neutralism, and they were very keen on maintaining Iran as an allied country in the region.”
The United States’ relationship with Iran did an about-face after the 1979 overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic. But Collier says even though the U.S. doesn’t seem interested in Iranian democracy, he’s optimistic.
“It’s not free as in the sense of the American system, but it does still maintain these institutions like the Parliament, and the Office of the President, which have a lot of history behind them and are seen as quite important,” Collier says. “But I think Iran is a good candidate for becoming a future democracy in more of a Western definition.”
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FULL TRANSCRIPT
SUZETTE GRILLOT, HOST: David Collier, welcome to World Views.
DAVID COLLIER: Yeah, thank you for having me.
GRILLOT: So, David, I want to start by looking at your work on U.S.-Iranian relations. But rather than talking first about contemporary relations and kind of where we are today, we should eventually get there, but let's go back. I mean, you really focus a lot on the historical relationship and some of the ways in which the United States has interacted with Iran for many decades, many decades ago. So kind of start, you know, historically, and give us a sense of what that relationship has been like over time.
COLLIER: Right, well my interest in Iran came from looking at how the U.S. has sort of looked at democracy in the region. And I think, in relation to Iran, we look at Iran today, you don't think too much about the democratization efforts that took part in the 20th century. So always when I was doing my research I was quite surprised by how much democracy was a factor in U.S. relations with Iran and how democracy advanced in Iran. So I started my dissertation in looking at 1941 when the Shah was put on to the throne. His father was basically told to leave; he was a bit too close to Nazi Germany. And so the Allied Powers told him, "you have to leave and be replaced by your son, who we can maybe control better." And so for the first few years of Roosevelt's relations with the new Shah, the U.S. sort of promoted democracy and was happy to let democratic institutions grow. They made sure the Shah was placed more on the outside of politics, which was much to his annoyance. He wanted to be more involved, but he was still very young; I think he was 21, 22, when he first came to power. So he was more amenable to being pressured by the U.S. to stay on the outside. I know for the course of the 20th century, the United States' interest in democracy kind of waned over time. Other interests, such as oil and Communism, became more dominant and democracy took a slightly back seat in how the U.S. approached Iran, especially with Iran being on the border of the Soviet Union. So over time, after Roosevelt's passing in 19-mid-40s, you see U.S. policy changing slightly and focusing more on stability, on security. And the Shah was seen as the best bet for maintaining security and he was brought back into power. And over the course of the decades, more and more, he became more and more powerful, the U.S. supported him more and more: gave him more financial aid, more military aid. So over time the U.S. interest in democracy waned, and anti-communism and stability was more important by the 70s, definitely; In the late 70s they still supported him despite the big protests and the calls for democracy.
GRILLOT: You said you were surprised by the history of democracy in Iran as you started to do your research. Can you give us some indication of what the signs of democracy were in Iran so that we have a better sense of its own democratic history and political culture that would have sustained a democratic form of governance at one point in time?
COLLIER: Sure. Yeah, well, Iran's democratic history dates back to, like, the 19th century. In the late 19th century there were many protests against the Qajar Monarchy, demanding more rights and more freedoms. And there was a constitutional revolution in the early 1900s, which sort of set out more powers for the people, Parliament, trying to limit the powers of the Monarchy. So, the Constitutional Revolution continued for five or six years, but eventually was subsumed by the return to power of the Shah. So that was the first sort of main thrust of democracy in Iran. So they've had a parliament since 1905. And their constitution was based, I think, on the Belgium Constitution, which was the most advanced one at the time. So it was very advanced. A lot of thought went into maintaining democracy and developing it in the best sense, in the most modern way. So when the Shahs came back into power and there was the change in monarchy between the Qajars and the Pahlavis in 1921, the Shahs became more powerful, but these institutions still survived, although greatly undermined. So by the time the Shah, the new Shah in 1941, came to power, he had to cope with these institutions. And it was these that the United States supported: the Parliament, civil society, which had a lot of history of like 50 years of development. So these were around at that time.
GRILLOT: So, clearly Iran got caught up in Cold War politics like many other countries did around the world. You mentioned that democracy eventually took a back seat to interests in stability and security in the region vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Therefore, the United States' support for democracy, you know, promotion of democracy in the region came to an end. But you've also written about how the United States played a significant in impeding democracy and actually trying to prevent it from taking place. So, it's one thing to say, "security and stability matters, and so we aren't promoting democracy," but it's another thing to say, you know, "we're working against democratic revolution, or democratic movements, or democratization in this country." So, what is it that might help us understand the move from a focus on safety and security, which we can understand, but the lack of, or actually working against, or actively working against democratization in Iran?
COLLIER: I think the main turning point was the coup, the 1953 coup, which came about after an uprising of people-power, people calling again for democracy and for more rights. And it took on a very nationalistic sentiment, I think because the U.S. and Britain had been trying to force Iran into taking certain policies. This caused a sort of rise in nationalism in Iran and a feeling that they wanted to regain control and power. And so the U.S. came to see democracy as nationalism. And that was dangerous to their interests. They worried about Iran. If it was independent, it may move more towards the Soviet Union or to neutralism, and they were very keen on maintaining Iran as a source of an allied country in the region, so democracy was sort of seen as being against U.S. strategic and security interests. So they actively sort of prevented it. So they didn't another Mosaddeq, didn't want another return to nationalism and the chaos that ensues from there. And there's also the Tudeh Party in Iran, which was the communist party. They were very popular. And they worried if there was free elections, the Tudeh will be able to come into power, and Iran would be lost to Communism that way. So democracy was seen as dangerous for the U.S. during the heights of the Cold War.
GRILLOT: Well, so, before we bring things up to date and talk about the potential for democracy today in Iran, let's first talk about something else you've done some work on. And that is the vision that Justice William O. Douglas had toward Iran. Douglas served on the Supreme Court of the United States from 1939 to 1975, and he lectured widely and wrote about Iran. It's something, I think, we don't really know much about. So, tell us a little bit about how a Supreme Court justice actually played a role in this growing issue about democratization versus nationalism versus, you know, security and stability in this very important country.
COLLIER: Yeah, well, Douglas famously said that his role in the Supreme Court only took four days a week, which gave him lots of time for other interests. Some people say that's why some of his opinions were very thorough and sort of lacked sort of critical insights. But he did develop lots of different interests. He was very interested in the environment, in civil liberties. But he was also keenly interested in foreign affairs, and he was able to take many trips abroad, trying to increase his knowledge of the world. He had some interests in the future in becoming Secretary of State, or maybe President in the future. So he thought these trips would be helpful to give him a sense of importance, of he's been to these places, he knows what he's talking about. And in the late 40s, early 50s, he took two trips to Iran, and he traveled throughout the country. He met with the tribes, he met with the politicians, he met with Mosaddeq. So he developed a very keen interest in Iran. and his own views were, very strongly, that democracy was the way forward, that the United States should support democracy. But not in the way that... the U.S. shouldn't sort of... Not top-down democracy. He interested in democracy coming from the bottom up. So supporting local grassroots initiatives to develop democracy, not in a Western image, but in an image that would form naturally from that country. So his views were very different to the United States Government, and he was very, a senior figure at the time, so he had lots of influence. He wrote very popular articles and books. So his views on Iran were very important, I think. And he was very close to Roosevelt, which therefore made him important to Truman, because he was seen as a potential presidential candidate in the future. So his views were very important at that time, but also in the early 60s with Kennedy. He had become a family friend of Joseph Kennedy, JFK's father, so he was very influential during the Kennedy period as well.
GRILLOT: So, it's interesting that he was somewhat of an advocate, given his background and interests, an advocate for promoting democracy and working closely with Iran. Is there a similar advocate like this today? Do we see anybody similar to Justice Douglas? It doesn't seem to me that it's very evident, but...
COLLIER: I don't think so. I think it's very hard today. He was almost unique in having a very high-level official of the United States being able to go to Iran and travel quite freely. I can't imagine that happening today, at the moment, with the relations of the two countries. But I think it's something that's definitely needed, that I think we need. One of his famous sayings was, "Iran needs to be known more intimately by the West." And by that he means going there, meeting the people, meeting the tribes: not just the leaders, but the people in the cities and the villages, which, I think, is something very important and something that we're missing today.
GRILLOT: Well, so that leads us, then, to this issue of Iran today. I mean, when we think of Iran today, certainly we don't necessarily think automatically of democracy and democratization. But it sounds like, given their history and their background, there is that potential there. Given your studies and what you focus on today, what you know about Iran today, how should we feel about this? Does this past experience give us any hope that perhaps there'll be a return to democratic governance someday in Iran? And is the United States, will the United States, can the United States help move that forward in any way, shape, or form? Obviously, you know, returning to some sort of normal relationship will be required for that, right? So, you know, is this likely to happen?
COLLIER: Yeah, well, I think democracy, it's very hard to define what democracy is. I think if you ask, like, 10 political scientists what democracy is, you'll get at least 11 or 12 different answers. So, I think Iran's system right now, it does have elections, it does have a parliament. And it's not free as in the sense of the American system, but it does still maintain these institutions like the Parliament, and the Office of President, which have a lot of history behind them and seen as quite important. So these are still maintained today, and there's a lot of talk about having democratic legacies being important for future transitions to democracy. So all these things being maintained, in the future it's very likely that these things will help a future transition if the situation arises. But right now, I don't think the U.S. is interested in democracy right now in Iran. They're focusing on the nuclear issue first and foremost, and pretty much only that. And once that's settled, which will hopefully become settled, then they might start thinking about, "how can we sort of push more freedom, more liberties in Iran?" But for now, I think, they're more focused on nuclear issues and seeing what will happen farther down road. But I think Iran is a good candidate for becoming a future democracy in more of a Western definition of democracy.
GRILLOT: Civil society has been able to be maintained in Iran to an extent. I mean, it sounds like what you're saying is that there's some sort of grassroots ability to move democracy forward if the opportunity arises.
COLLIER: Right. If the opportunity arises. They have experiences, which they can build on in the future, which is very important for democratization. But they need to be given the freedom to actually work on this in the open and sort of canvass people on the streets and things, which I think is not possible as much as it has been in the past. In the early 20th century, I think, it was a very different situation than today. But, having these legacies of democracy is very important.
GRILLOT: Well, David, thank you so much for being with us today on World Views to talk about this very important issue that has significant implications today for the United States and Iran both. So thank you very much for being here.
COLLIER: Thank you for having me.
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